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In a vertically differentiated monopolistic framework with discrete preferences we examine how 
protecting the low-quality segment raises the incentive for quality innovation. We show how the 
monopolist facing competitive imports, might fail to exert its complete monopoly power even if there 
is prohibitive tariff on both the high and low quality segment of the market. On the other hand, given 
non prohibitive tariff on the high quality segment, the potential gain for the monopolist exhausts at a 
level much below the prohibitive low-quality tariff level. Also a sufficiently low tariff on the high 
quality product can force the monopolist to produce the first best qualities irrespective of the tariff 
level on the low quality product. 
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Singapore. 1. Introduction 
Whether trade liberalization fosters innovation is a debated issue both theoretically and empirically. 
In the Indian context, Desai (1980), Lall (1984) and Marjit and Raychaudhuri (1997) argued quite 
strongly that tariff protection had eliminated innovation incentives whatsoever and made the 
domestic firms inward looking during the 1970s and 1980s. Whatever little innovation that took 
place were just minor innovations instead of at the frontiers of technology. A similar argument has 
often been put forward for other developing countries in the countless debates over trade 
liberalization as an appropriate export promotion strategy. But casual empiricism observes a mixed 
experience in this regard. Lowering of tariff has raised the R&D level in some countries whereas 
has lowered it in others. Aw and Roberts (1986) also found that the 1977-81 quota on footwear 
from Korea and Taiwan led to the quality upgrading of most important bundles throughout the 
period.
1 
    Theoretical  analyses  linking  trade  liberalization (or protection) and innovation have also 
remained inconclusive. That too much market power for the domestic firms is not conducive for 
innovation has also been argued by Porter (1990), White (1974) among others. Segerstorm et. al. 
(1990) put similar argument in a dynamic general equilibrium North-South model. On the other 
hand, Clemenz (1990) and Reitzes (1991) derived just the opposite result which essentially 
captures the Schumpeterian idea that market power and innovation are positively related [Kamien 
and Schwartz (1982)]. In a similar spirit, Rodrik (1992) demonstrated that in a dynamic set up, 
liberalization slows down the pace of the productivity increase and delays technological catch up 
since it shrinks the domestic monopolist’s sales and thus reduces incentives to invest in cost-
reducing technology.  
                                                 
1 Also Feenstra (1998) showed that the US-imposed VER between 1981 and 1985, affected both the price and quality 






          This  paper  provides  a  similar  argument that protection fosters (quality) innovation in a 
vertically differentiated market. The present analysis, however, differs from the earlier ones in the 
assumption of a heterogeneous set of consumers with different preferences for the quality-
differentiated good as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). It is sometimes realistic to assume holes in 
consumer preferences rather than continuous consumer preferences.
2 The assumption of continuous 
preferences corresponds to no naturally occurring or laboratory economy, but has proved a fairly 
innocuous simplification in many economic exercises. But we in this exercise assume discrete 
consumer preferences with two types of consumers differing in their marginal willingness to pay 
for quality. In this framework, we examine the relationship between tariff protection quality up-
grading and post innovative optimal quality choice by a quality constrained monopolist
3. The 
monopolist is quality constrained in the sense that it has the technological capability to produce 
qualities upto a certain level. It can gain the technological know how to produce qualities beyond 
that by spending a fixed sum in R&D. To put it differently, we conceive a situation where initial 
technological constraint does not allow him to offer the menu to the high-type that he would prefer. 
Only through innovation he can practice such discrimination and with competitive imports of 
similar varieties from abroad such gains are realized only under tariff protection. This, in essence, 
is similar to the Schumpeterian idea that protection increases the incentive for quality up-grading. 
Thus, pre-innovation, the monopolist was forced to produce a suboptimal (low) quality from a 
welfare point of view. We show that in our framework this tariff induced innovation helps mitigate 
quality distortion by the domestic monopolist to a large extent and thus this tariff protection is non-
                                                 
2 Recently several papers addressed optimal trade policy under vertical differentiation (see Herguera and Lutz (1998), 
Vandenbussche and Wauthy (2001), Herguera, Kujal and Petrakis (2002), etc.). 
3 Of late, incentives for quality innovation and choice of innovation type have been examined for a closed economy by 
Bandyopadhyay and Acharyya (2003) and Lambertini and Orsini (2000).  distortionary (except for the cost of innovation).
4 Obviously there will be the usual price distortion 
from monopoly pricing. Noteworthy is the fact that the monopolist is unable to exert its complete 
monopoly power even if there is prohibitive tariff on both the high and low quality varieties! To 
put it differently, in this model there will be no downward quality distortion by the monopolist at 
the lower end of the market even if both the high end and the low end of the market is completely 
protected.
5  Moreover, the monopolists’ post-innovative potential gain increases if the low quality 
tariff is increased beyond the prohibitive tariff level. Whereas, on the contrary, when there is a non 
prohibitive tariff on the high end of the market the potential gain for the monopolist exhausts at  a 
level much below than the prohibitive tariff level. We also show how a sufficiently low tariff on the 
high quality product can force the monopolist to produce the first best qualities irrespective of the 
tariff level on the low quality product. It will also be interesting to note the rates at which the 
innovation incentive increases for different protection levels.  
           The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay down the framework. In 
section 3 we examine the innovation incentive and quality choice by the monopolist when the high-
quality good segment is completely protected. Section 4 considers the case of non prohibitive tariff 
on high quality product. In section 5 we discuss very briefly the implication of a reduction in the 






                                                 
4 Protection to the domestic monopolist can be motivated along the infant industry protection argument and also from a 
political economic point of view. We will touch upon these issues as we proceed.  






2. The Framework 
Consider a vertically differentiated good with observable quality indexed by  [ ] q q , 0 ∈ . Suppose, 
domestic production is monopolized by a single firm. Though the present state of scientific 
knowledge makes it possible to produce the good elsewhere over such a range of qualities, the 
domestic monopolist is technologically constrained in the sense that the technology he has access 
to allows him to produce only qualities within the range [ ] 1
~ , 0 q  but not beyond that, where  q q < 1
~ . 
We shall later define quality innovation as a process whereby investing an exogenously given sum 
of  q F , he can learn the technical know-how to produce all  [ ] q q q , ~
1 ∈
6. In other words the cost can 
be defined as a function of  1
~ q q −  which is constant given q and  1
~ q . With marginal cost of 
production invariant with respect to the output level but varying with the quality level, the cost 
function in the pre-innovation stage for this domestic monopolist can be defined as, 
                
2 q c C =    [] 1
~ , 0 q q∈ ∀  
                   = ∝   otherwise                                                                                                               (1) 
There are two types of consumers at home who differ in respect of their taste parameters:  1 2 α α > . 
The number of consumers of each type is ni. Each consumer buys, if at all, only one unit of the 
good. The net utility that type-αj consumer derives from the menu (qj, Pj) is assumed to be linear, 
which is just a simplification: 
                Uj = αj q – P,    j = 1,2                                                                                                      (2) 
This preference function satisfies two important properties that are typically assumed in the 
literature: High-type consumers derive greater total as well as marginal utility than low-type 
                                                 
6 In international trade theory there are models where quality affects variable production costs and there is no up-front 
R&D costs (See Krishna (1987), Bond (1988), Das and Donnenfeld (1987, 1989)). These are variable cost or quality 
models. Our model is also a variable cost of quality model (see later) with a positive fixed R&D investment cost. In 
this sense in essence our structure incorporates both the features of variable and fixed cost of quality improvement. consumers from any quality. Thus, the (linear) indifference curves between price and quality of the 
two types cross each other only once [Cooper (1984)].  
   A typical type-αj consumer participates in the market if, 
            αj q ≥  P                                                                                                                                 (3) 
and selects the menu (q2,P2) if the following self-selection constraint is satisfied, 
           αj q2 -  P2 ≥ αj q1 – P1                                                                                                            (4) 
for q2 > q1. 
    It is instructive at this point to look at the quality choice of the home firm had it not been 
technologically constrained, and faced no competition from abroad whatsoever. This exercise will 
help us understand the technological constraint and the potential gains from innovation. Under such 
a completely protected trade regime, at a separating equilibrium the unconstrained home firm 
would have chosen the following monopoly qualities that maximize his profit, 
} ) ( { ) (
2
2 1 1 1 2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1 q c q q q n q c q n − + − + − = α α α π : 
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1 2 2 1 1
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=                                                                                               (5) 
Of course, we must assume that the low end of the domestic market is sufficiently large, in the 










, for this separating menu (i.e.,  0 ~
1 > q ) to be the profit maximizing 
menu
7. Otherwise the monopolist will offer  2
~ q  at price  2 2
~ q α  to the  2 α -consumers and will exclude 
the  1 α -type from the market. It is immediate that the technological constraint defined above, is 
assumed to be binding in the sense that without investing in R&D, it is possible for the home firm 
to offer at most  1
~ q  level of quality. Pre-innovation, his problem then simply boils down to whether 
                                                 






to extract all surplus from the high-type by charging their reservation price which, of course, drives 
low-type consumers out of the market, or to offer a pooling menu by charging the reservation price 
of the low-types which leaves high-types with some surplus. The same restriction on the 
distribution pattern mentioned above, however, imply that the pooling menu,  1 1 2 1 1
~ , ~ q P P q α = = , is 
relatively profitable. It is a standard wisdom that  1
~ q  is suboptimal but  2
~ q  is optimal from a welfare 
point of view. In other words there is downward quality distortion in the low-quality segment of the 
monopolistic market. 
Suppose the world market for this quality-differentiated good is perfectly competitive
8 and that 
imports are subject to a tariff duty per unit. As long as the tariff duty is non-prohibitive, the 
domestic consumers have the option to buy the domestic variety  1
~ q  at some price that the home 
firm would charge under such competition or the imported varieties at the tariff-inclusive 
(competitive) price. Suppose, producers abroad have identical cost of quality as the home firm 
except that they have no technological constraint. Thus, 
2 * q c C = [ ] q q , 0 ∈ ∀ . These simplifying 







= , j = 1,2, to 
the αj-type home consumers. It is important to point out that in this competitive equilibrium the  1 α -
type consume  * 1 q  at price 
2










Similarly the  2 α  consumers purchase  * 2 q  at price 
2









. This is different from the separating monopoly equilibrium where the  1 α -type get 0 
net utility and the  2 α  type derive positive net utility.  
                                                 
8 This assumption rules out export possibilities. 3. Prohibitive high-quality tariff: 
    Keeping with the observation that often imports of different quality are subject to differential 
tariff rates we assume that tariff rate t1 is applied to all imports with qualities q < 
*
2 q  whereas the 
rate t2 is applied to all imports of quality 
*
2 q  or higher. Moreover, for the time being let us assume 
that initially t1 is set at some non-prohibitive level, t2 is set at the prohibitive level in the sense 
defined below. Note that, with competitive imports from abroad, the high-end of the home market 
must be protected from import of similar high-quality varieties to ensure positive rents from 
innovation for the home firm.  For example, if t2 is zero, the home firm can gain nothing by 
offering a quality 
*
2 q  or higher, and therefore will have no incentive at all to innovate such 
qualities. This though does not mean that the high-end of the market should be completely 
protected through a prohibitive tariff, we assume so to focus solely on how increase in the tariff on 
low-quality imports raise the incentive for innovation despite raising the profit from selling just the 
low-quality variety.  Later we will relax this assumption and consider the case of non-prohibitive 
tariff on both the high and low quality products.  
   Given such initial tariff regimes, the tariff inclusive domestic price of the imported quality  * 1 q  
equals  1
2
1 1 * t q c P
d + =  
9. But the home firm must charge a price  ( ) 1 1 t P  strictly less than this to 
induce the low-type consumers to buy the domestic variety  1
~ q . A little manipulation of the self-
selection constraint of the  1 α -type consumers yields such a price as, 
          () ε α α − + + − = 1
2




1 q q t q c                                     (6) 
                                                 
9 Since the indifference curves (or self-selection constraints) are vertically parallel and the tariff shifts up the marginal 
cost curve of the foreign producers in a parallel fashion, their selection of profit-maximizing qualities for the domestic-






But the home firm will operate only if this price ( ) 1 1 t P  covers marginal cost of producing  1
~ q . From 





~ ~ ~ q q c q q t + − − = α  that must at 
least be offered to protect the domestic firm. That is, for all  [ ] 1 1
~ , 0 t t ∈ , domestic production is zero. 
At the other extreme the domestic government can set a prohibitive tariff  1 P t  on the low-quality 
import  * 1 q  such that the home firm can charge the monopoly price along the individual rationality 
constraint of the  1 α -type consumers i.e.  ( ) 1 1 t P  =  1 1
~ q α . Using (6) and for ε  sufficiently close to zero 
we get the prohibitive tariff on the low-quality import as  1 P t = 
2
1 1 1 * * q c q − α . Therefore, 
[ ] 1
~ , 0 t t∈ ∀ , the low-type domestic consumers will buy the imported variety  * 1 q  whereas 
[ ] 1 1, ~
P t t t ∈ ∀  they will buy the variety  1
~ q  offered by the domestic monopolist. 
      On  the  other  hand,  given  a  prohibitively high tariff on high-quality variety, the high-type 
domestic consumers must choose between the imported variety  * 1 q  at price  1
2
1 1 * t q c P
d + =  and the 
domestic variety  1
~ q  at  () 1 1 t P  in the pre-innovation period. The following lemma specifies such a 
choice: 
Lemma 1:  In the pre-innovation stage, with a prohibitive tariff on the high-quality imported 
varieties, the high-type domestic consumers buy the imported variety  * 1 q   [] 1 1 , 0 P t t ∈ ∀  instead of 
the domestic variety,  1
~ q . 
Proof: Suppose, on the contrary that the high-type domestic consumers buy  1
~ q . Then, by the self-
selection constraint, the following must be true: 
            ()
d P q t P q 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 * ~ − > − α α   1 t ∀  
By (6), this boils down to, 
           () () ε α α α α − − > −
*
1 1 2 1 1 2
~ q q  But 
*
1 1
~ q q < and  0 > ε . Hence a contradiction. ♦ 
Note that even a prohibitively high tariff on import of high-quality varieties cannot protect the 
home firm in the high-segment of the market
10. Thus such a tariff is essentially ineffective. But as 
we will see, after innovation, this will enable the home firm to extract surplus from the high-type 
consumers. 
   Given the above segmentation of the home market among the home firm and competitive foreign 
producers, in the pre-innovation stage, the home firm’s profit equals, 






1 1 1 1 1
~ ~ q c t q c q q n − + + − = ∏ α α                                                                                          (7) 
3.1 Quality Innovation 
Consider an instantaneous and certain innovation process whereby investing a fixed sum F the 
monopolist can develop all qualities over the range [ ] q q , ~
1 . If innovation is undertaken at all, the 
home firm is no longer technologically constrained to choose the profit maximizing qualities, 
denoted by q1
I and q2
I. But with the low-quality variety  * 1 q  imported from abroad under a non-
prohibitive tariff, he must ensure that low-type consumers purchase q1
I and high-type consumers 
buy q2
I instead of  *
1 q . That is, he must charge p1 and p2 such that, 
          p1(t1) = α1q1
I – (
2
1 1 1 * * q c q − α ) + t1- ε                                                                                 (8a) 
          p2(t1) = α2(q2
I  -  *
1 q ) +  ) ( 1
2 *
1 t q c +                                                                                         (8b) 
                                                 





1 2 1 q c q c q q t − − − = α , the home firm can charge a price 




1 q q t q c − − + α lower than P1(t1) and induce even the high-types to buy the domestic variety  1
~ q . 























 in the opposite case, such a price yields a lower profit for the 
home firm than P1(t1) for all  [] 1 1 , 0 P t t ∈ . Thus, under these conditions, the home firm charges P1(t1) and the high-type 







Given such prices, it is straightforward to check that the home firm’s choices of qi
I that maximize 
π(t) = n1[p1(t) - 
2
1
I q c ] + n2[ p2(t) - 
2
2
I q c ] are the same as the imported qualities: q1
I = 
*
1 q , q2
I =  2
~ q = 
*
2 q . This result is, of course, due to the specific tariff that does not alter the marginal cost of quality 
and the vertically parallel property of indifference curves between price and quality.  
Thus the monopolist’s profit in the post innovative situation is, 








2 2 q c q c q q − − − α ]                                                             (9) 
The gain from innovation is simply the gain from quality discrimination. With heterogeneous set of 










, quality discrimination or a separating menu defined in (5) 
maximizes the home firm’s profit. But without innovation, this was simply not feasible and the 
home firm was compelled to offer a pooling menu. Innovation allows him to discriminate between 
the two types and therefore to extract greater surplus from the high-type. However, competition 
from foreign producers under non-prohibitive tariff on low-quality imports restricts the ability of 
the home firm to discriminate to the extent it would have done under complete protection as 
indicated by the menu defined in (5). Formally, for  [ ] 1 1, ~
P t t t ∈ ∀  














1 1 q c q c q q − + − α ]  
                                                                                                                                                         (10)                       
whereas for  [ ] 1 1
~ , 0 t t ∈ , since pre-innovation profit is zero, so RG(IN) =  π(IN). In any case the gain 
from innovation increases with the rate of tariff on low-quality imports, initially at the rate (n1 + n2) 
and then at a smaller rate n2. Thus, 
 
 Proposition 1:  
Given prohibitive tariff on the high-quality variety, any specific or per unit tariff on import of 
low-quality variety, regardless of whether it is protective or not, raises the incentive for quality 
innovation. 
 
A higher tariff on low quality imports enables the domestic firm to raise price of such variety, and 
consequently to raise the price of the high-quality variety as well along the higher self-selection 
constraint of the high-type consumers. It is because of this scope of extracting a greater surplus 
from the high-type that a higher tariff on low-quality imports increases the gain from quality 
innovation and consequently the incentive for quality innovation. But does the potential to extract 
greater surplus for the monopolist exhaust at  1 P t ? Interestingly the answer is no. The monopolist 
cannot charge the monopoly price on  * 1 q  even if t is set at  1 P t . The following lemma states exactly 
that: 
Lemma2: At  1 1 P t t =  the monopolist cannot charge the monopoly price on  * 2 q , it can at most 




2 1 1 1
2
2 * * * * q q c q t q c P − + = + α . 
Proof: Monopoly price of  * 2 q  when the monopolist offers  1
~ q  to the low-type is 
() 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
~ ~ * * q q q q P m α α α + − = .                                                                                                        (11) 
















− + − = = − q
q q
t t P q P P m α α . 
In other words the above lemma points to the fact that  2 1 P P t t <  where 
() 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
~ * * q q c q tP α α α − − − = . But most interesting is what happens when  1 1 P t t > . The 






the  1 α  type consumers and in the process charges a higher price on the high quality product. This 








ˆ α α −
+ =  where the price charged on the high quality is exactly equal 
to that charged by a discriminating monopolist, i.e. according to the IC constraint of the  2 α  type 
consumers. The proposition below formally states the result: 
Proposition 2: 
 
The monopolist finds it optimal to modify the low quality  ] ˆ , ( 1 1 1 t t t P ∈ ∀  where the optimal low 
quality offered will be ( )
() 1 2
1 1













ˆ α α −
+ =  and all  ] ˆ , ( 1 1 1 t t t P ∈  is 
distortionary. 
Proof: Let  1 ˆ q  be the low quality offered by the monopolist at price  1 1ˆ q α to the  1 α -type. We know 
that the monopolist offers  * 2 q  at price  ( ) ( ) 1
2
1 1 2 2 1 2 * * * t q c q q t P + + − = α  to the  2 α -type consumers. 
From the self-selection constraint of the  2 α -type we get 
            () 1
2
1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 * * * * ˆ ˆ t q c q q q q q − − − − = − α α α α  
            ()
() 1 2
1 1





q q .                                                                                                        (12) 
The maximum possible value of  1 t  can be found when  ( ) 1 2 t P  is equal to the monopoly price of  * 2 q  
i.e. when  () 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2








ˆ α α −
+ = . 
Needless to point out, that all  1 t 1 P t > leads to downward quality distortion of the low-quality 
segment of the market since  * ˆ 1 1 q q <  where  * 1 q  is the socially optimal low quality. 
What is evident from the above proposition is the fact that the monopolist is not fully protected 
even if there is prohibitive tariff in both the low and high quality products. The incentive structure is such that  1 t  needs to be higher than  1 P t  so that the monopolist is completely protected. The 
relative gain in this situation will be 
        () = Q RG []( ) [ ]
2





1 1 1 1
~ ~
4
ˆ ˆ q c q n
c
n
t n q c q n − −
−
+ + − α
α α
α
11                                            (13) 
But what will be the relative gain look like  ] ˆ , ( 1 1 1 t t t P ∈ ∀ ? The following proposition provides an 
answer: 
Proposition 3:  
The relative gain from innovation reaches maximum at  1 1 ˆ t t =  and  ] ˆ , ( 1 1 1 t t t P ∈ ∀  the relative gain 
increases at a decreasing rate. 
Proof:  Put  ()
() 1 2
1 1





q q  into (13) and maximize the expression with respect to  1 t . It is easy 








ˆ α α −




















This completes the proof. 
The curvature can be explained by the fact that as  1 t  gets increased beyond  1 P t  there is a gain from 
the high end of the market as well as a loss from the low-end of the market. The former outweighs 
the latter and the gain increases but at a falling rate. One result that’s immediately become apparent 
is that in this model given the implicit threat of entry and given prohibitive tariff on the high quality 
segment downward quality distortion at the lower end of the market by the monopolist can only 
happen for very high low quality tariff ranges: in this situation for more than prohibitive tariff 
ranges. This surprising implication is off course due to the incentive structure of the model and also 
points out how strong the threat of potential entry might be in mitigating quality distortion. But of 
                                                 
11 Note that the pre-innovation profit for all  1 1 P t t >  is  [ ]
2
1 1 1 1






course there will be the usual price distortion. More interesting results of this kind follow where we 
discuss the case of uniform tariff protection and non-prohibitive high quality tariff case. But before 
that we examine the innovation decision by the monopolist in this situation. 
       Given that innovation involves a (fixed) cost,  q F , which it can save upon by not undertaking 
innovation. Thus such gains from innovation must cover the cost of innovation. For all non-
protective tariff,  [ ] 1 1
~ , 0 t t ∈ , it is immediate that all viable innovations (i.e., innovations for which 
π(IN) >  q F ) will be undertaken. But for protective tariff rates, only those innovations for which 
RG(IN) >  q F  will be undertaken. The innovation decision is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 Goes Here 
Given the positively sloped RG(IN) curve, we can define a level of (fixed) innovation cost,  q F
~
 such 
that the relative (net) gain from quality innovation (for  1 P t ) is exactly zero. For all  q F  greater than 
this the domestic monopolist will only innovate for  1 1 P t t > . But, for  [ ] q q F F
~
, 0 ∈ , the innovation 
decision depends on the level of protection. For example, for 
0
q q F F = , the monopolist undertakes 
innovation only for a  [ ] 1
0
1 1 ˆ ,t t t ∈ . That is, given an initial situation where the tariff on low-quality 
import is smaller than 
0
1 t , the government can induce the domestic monopolist to innovate by 
raising the tariff rate beyond 
0
1 t . 
 
3.2: Some Welfare Results: 
It is interesting to check welfare gains from tariff protections which induce innovation as discussed 
above. Here the domestic welfare is defined as the total surplus: sum of consumers surplus and 
profit of the domestic firm.     First consider the welfare property of tariff  1 t  on the low-quality imports given prohibitive tariff 
on the high-quality good. Following lemma makes a definite statement in this regard: 
Proposition 4: 
a)  Post innovation, given prohibitive tariff on the high-quality good, any low-quality tariff 
1 t [] 1 , 0 P t ∈  is non-distortionary. 
b)  All  ] ˆ , ( 1 1 1 t t t P ∈  is distortionary. 
Proof:  
a)  Given tariff  1 t [] 1 , 0 P t ∈  on the low-quality good, the total surplus that the  1 α  consumers derive is 
given by  [ ] 1
2
1 1 1 1 * * t q c q n − − α  and the total surplus of the  2 α  consumers is 
() [ ] 1
2
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 * * * * t q c q q q n − − − −α α . The monopolist’s gross post-innovative profit is (n1 + n2)t1 +  








2 2 q c q c q q − − − α ]. Adding consumers’ surplus and the producers’ surplus and 
rearranging terms we get the total welfare as  [ ] [ ]
2
2 2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1 * * * * q c q n q c q n − + − α α  which is nothing 
but the perfectly competitive total consumers surplus from both  1 α  and  2 α  types. This completes 
the proof. 
b) The consumer surplus of the  1 α -type ∀ ] ˆ , ( 1 1 1 t t t P ∈  is zero since the monopolist will extract all 
surplus from the  1 α -type. The optimal low-quality offered is given in equation (12). The price 
charged to the  2 α -type consumers will be  1 1 1 2 2 2 ˆ ˆ * q q q α α α + − . Therefore the total surplus of the 
2 α -type consumers after some calculations turn out to be  ( ) 1 1 2 2 ˆ q n α α − . The total producer’s 
surplus is  ( ) [ ]
2
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1 * ˆ ˆ * ˆ ˆ q c q q q n q c q n − + − + − α α α α .  Summing total consumer surplus and 
producer surplus we get the total welfare as  ( ) [ ]
2
2 2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1 * * ˆ ˆ q c q n q c q n − + − α α  which is less than 






The above results can be explained as follows. For all  1 t [ ] 1 , 0 P t ∈ , the domestic firm acts like a 
price-taker since, facing competitive imports from abroad, it cannot raise the price of its product 
more than the tariff-inclusive marginal cost of production for any given quality. The tariff enables 
it to raise price of its low-quality variety above the corresponding marginal cost only to the extent it 
raises the foreign import price. By the vertically parallel property of consumer preferences, such 
tariff-inclusive higher prices, however, leaves optimal choice of qualities by the domestic firm the 
same as the imported qualities. Consequently, tariff just redistributes total surplus among domestic 
consumers and producer without generating any quality distortion and, therefore, any dead-weight 
loss. 
  But when t = tP1, the tariff-inclusive price of imported low-quality good become so high as to 
leave domestic consumers with no surplus. For all tariffs higher than this low-type domestic 
consumers are better-off by not consuming the imported variety. This creates scope for the 
domestic firm to offer them a lower quality than the imported variety at their reservation price and 
to extract more surplus from the high-type through consequent increased quality differentiation and 
discrimination. Therefore, all such tariffs put a dead-weight loss and lower total surplus. 
           The above result is important in the sense that in this structure, post innovation, even a 
prohibitive tariff on the high-quality variety and a sufficiently high tariff on the low-quality product 
induce no deadweight loss except for the cost of product innovation. This follows from the fact that 
there is no quality distortion both in the low and high quality segment of the market. There will 
only be the usual price distortion from monopoly pricing. Thus this protection can be justified 
along the infant industry protection argument and one can also argue from a political economic 
point of view that there are evidences where the domestic industry had a greater lobbying power to influence government policies
12. Since our objective in this paper is somewhat different we abstract 
from these issues. It can also be pointed out that quality innovation in a sense removes any 
distortion that might have existed pre-innovation even for sufficiently high tariffs on the low and 
high quality products. But if  1 t  is increased beyond the prohibitive level there will be distortion in 
the economy stemming from the downward quality distortion from the low-quality segment of the 
market. 
Next we consider the case where there is a non prohibitive tariff on the high-quality product and we 
examine the post innovative quality choice. 
   
4. Non-prohibitive tariff on high quality: 
We now consider the situation when there is a non-prohibitive tariff on the high quality product. 
The pre-innovation situation is more or less the same except for the fact that the  2 α  type consumers 
might consume  * 1 q  or  * 2 q  depending on the level of  1 t  and  2 t . But the pre-innovative profit for 
the monopolist capable of producing upto  1
~ q  remain the same.  
To proceed with the analysis further we state the following lemma.  
Lemma3:  () 2 1 2 , *   P P t t t ∈ ∃  such that  2 α -type is indifferent between  * 2 q  at price  * * 2
2
2 t q c +  and 
* 1 q  at price  * 1 1q α  where  ()
2
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 * * * * * q c q q q t − + − = α α . 
Proof: From the self-selection constraint of the  2 α -type we get 
            * * * * * 2
2
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 t q c q q q − − = − α α α  
            () () [ ] 0
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q q t t P  and  ( )( ) 0 ~ * * 1 1 1 2 2 2 < − − − = − q q t t P α α  completes the 
proof.  
From the above lemma we can get the following 2 subcases:  
 
Case1:  *] , 0 ( 2 2 t t ∈  
We consider first the situation when  * 2
0




2 * t q c + . As usual let  1 t  be the tariff on the low-quality good. Thus the price of the lower quality 
variety in the domestic market will be  1
2
1* t q c + . From the IC constraint of the  2 α  type consumers 










 the monopolist will be better-off offering 
the bundle ( ) 1
2
1 1 * *, t q c q +  to the  1 α -type and  ( ) ( ) 1 2 2*, t P q  to the  2 α  type where 
() ( ) 1
2
1 1 2 2 1 2 * * * t q c q q t P + + − = α  and this comes directly from the IC constraint of the  2 α  type 
consumers. The gross gain for the monopolist in this situation will be  ()
c




1 2 1 1
α α −
+ + . But 
] , ( 1 1 1 P t t t ′ ∈ ∀  the monopolist will offer ( ) 1
2
1 1 * *, t q c q +  to the  1 α -type but it cannot increase the 




2 2 * *, t q c q +  to the  2 α  type and the gross gain 
will turn out to be 
0
2 2 1 1 t n t n + . It is evident that in this situation there is no potential gain for the 
monopolist if  1 t  is increased beyond  1 P t . Again interesting to note is that in this situation there will 
be no quality distortion in the market whatever be the level of  1 t . There will be the usual price 
distortion associated with monopoly pricing. 
 
 Proposition 5:  
With competitive producers abroad, there will be no quality distortion in the market ∀ *] , 0 ( 2 t t ∈  
whatever be the level of  1 t . 
Proof: Follows from the above discussion. 
In other words any  1 t  is non-distortionary in this situation. It is immediately apparent from the 
above proposition that tariff on the high-quality variety needs to be sufficiently higher for any 
quality distortion at the lower end of the market to exist. The relative gains for the monopolist in 
this situation will look like the following: 
[ ] 1 1
~ , 0 t t ∈ ∀ ,  = RG ()
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Note that  ] , ( 1 1 1 P t t t ′ ∈ ∀  the relative gain is invariant with respect to a change in  1 t . This is mainly 
due to the fact that as  1 t  is increased beyond  ′
1 t  the monopolist will increase the price of  * 1 q  by the 
same amount of  1 t  but the price of  * 2 q  cannot increase since  2 t  is fixed at 
0
2 t . This coupled with 
the fact that the pre-innovation gain depends on  1 t  makes the relative gain independent of  1 t  since it 
simply cancels out. Thus  ] , ( 1 1 1 P t t t ′ ∈ ∀  the relative gain will remain invariant to an increase in  1 t . 
This is illustrated in the following figure: 








Case 2:  ] *, ( 2 2 2 P t t t ∈ . 
Equally interesting case would be to consider  2
0
2 2 2* P t t t t < = < . In this case in the post innovative 
situation  [] 1 1 , 0 P t t ∈ ∀  the monopolist will offer the bundle ( ) 1
2
1 1 * *, t q c q +  to the  1 α -type and 
() () 1 2 2*, t P q  to the  2 α  type where  () 1 2 t P  is same as in the previous section and the gross gain will 
also be the same i.e.  ()
c




1 2 1 1
α α −
+ + . But in this situation there is a potential gain for the 
monopolist if  1 t  is increased beyond  1 P t . Quite similar to the prohibitive tariff case the monopolist 
will start adjusting downward the low quality offered in the market along the IR constraint of the 









q q . This can be found directly from the IC constraint of the  2 α  type and the 
computation is similar to the previous section. Note that if  1 t  is increased beyond  1 P t ,  * ˆ ˆ 1 1 q q < .  










. Thus  ] , ( 1 1 1
″ ∈ ∀ t t t P  there will be downward quality 
distortion in the market and the monopolists’ gross gain will be 
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Relative gain as usual can be found by subtracting  [ ]
2
1 1 1 1
~ ~ q c q n − α  from the above expression and 
the relative gain will be increasing and concave in  1 t  upto  ″ = 1 1 t t .  Thus the relative gain 
expressions will look like the following: 
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The difference between this situation and case1 is that in this case the monopolist gains from an 
increase in  1 t  beyond  1 P t  whereas in the earlier case monopolists gain exhausted for low quality 
tariff ranges below 1 P t . Also in the previous case there was no possibility of downward quality 
distortion but in this case there is a possibility if  1 t  is increased beyond  1 P t .  
 
5. Increasing/reducing t2 given any tariff on low-quality: A Discussion 
Before we wind this off we discuss very briefly the impact of a change in the tariff on high-quality 
good given any low quality tariff whether prohibitive or non-prohibitive. Let the low quality tariff 
is set at  1 t′. Given a tariff  2 t on the high quality product from we know that if 















 then there will be a 
separating equilibrium where the  1 α -type buys  * 1 q  at price  1
2
1* t q c ′ +  and the  2 α -type buys  * 2 q  
at price  2
2
2 * t q c + . But if  2 t  is increased beyond  2
~ t  the monopolist cannot charge a higher price for 
* 2 q  because the  2 α -type will then start buying the low quality product and the monopolist will be 
worse-off. Thus profit of the monopolist will remain fixed even if  2 2
~ t t > . The gross gain 
[ ] 2 2
~ , 0 t t ∈ ∀  will be  2 2 1 1 t n t n + ′  and  ] , ~ ( 2 2 2 P t t t ∈ ∀  is ( ) 1 2 1 t n n ′ + . Thus given  1 t  if  2 t  is increased the 
gross gain will increase at the rate  2 n . This is because the monopolist will be able to charge higher 
price on the high quality product. But if  2 t  is increased beyond that then the monopolists’ profit 









In a vertically differentiated domestic market with a single domestic firm facing discrete demand 
and competitive producers abroad we have demonstrated for different tariff ranges how tariff 
protection can raise the incentive for quality innovation. We have also examined how a monopolist 
might fail to exert complete monopoly power in the market even if both the high quality and the 
low quality segment of the market are completely protected. To put it differently, even if there is 
prohibitive tariff on the higher and lower segment of the market the monopolist will offer the first 
best qualities to both the high and low type consumers. Downward quality distortion at the lower 
end will occur only if the tariff on low quality product is increased beyond the prohibitive level. 
We have also seen that with competitive producers abroad the high quality tariff should be 
sufficiently higher for the possibility of downward quality distortion at the lower segment of the 
market whatever the tariff on the low quality product is.  
           This  analysis  differs  from  the  earlier  analyses  on  the  assumption  of  holes  in  consumer 
preferences that often lead to some interesting and counter-intuitive results. The earlier analyses do 
not focus explicitly on the innovation incentives of a quality constraint monopolist with respect to 
trade policy. Although the discrete consumer types with full market coverage rules out any demand 
effect whatsoever that may arise due to tariff protection, this analysis helps to capture the supply 
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